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The Arab Spring may have begun in Tunisia in December 2010 with mass protests that ultimately toppled the regime of Zine El 
Abidin Ben Ali, but that same month, pro-
testers also gathered in Amman’s streets, 
demanding political change. The Jorda-
nian demonstrations were never as large 
as those in Tunisia and were certainly not 
comparable to the mass protest rallies in 
Egypt’s Tahrir Square. They also differed 
in focus, calling for reform but not for 
regime change or revolution. Initially, they 
demanded the ouster of the government 
of Prime Minister Samir Rifai, and suc-
ceeded. But even after the shift in royally 
appointed governments, protesters contin-
ued to gather almost every Friday for the 
next several years, calling for more reform 
within the Hashemite kingdom.1  
 Jordan’s domestic protest movement 
included traditional sources of opposition, 
such as the kingdom’s relatively small 
leftist and pan-Arab nationalist political 
parties, as well as the much-larger Islamist 
movement, rooted in the Muslim Brother-
hood and its affiliated political party, the 
Islamic Action Front. But the protests also 
drew strength from newer sources of op-
position, including youth-based popular 
movements (al-Hirak), most of which were 
based in “East Banker” Jordanian commu-
nities that have historically been bastions 
of regime support.2 These protests ranged 
in focus from political goals (greater 
reform and democratization) to economic 
goals. The latter tended to include opposi-
tion to neoliberal economic policies, fear-
ing that privatization has proceeded too far, 
entailing severe social costs from a declin-
ing state commitment to subsidies, public-
sector employment and social welfare. 
 Jordan’s post-1989 move toward priva-
tization and neoliberalism had, in short, 
radically shifted the social and political 
bases for Hashemite rule.3 Therefore, the 
economic and political aspects of the trem-
ors of the Arab Spring were closely linked. 
This would have been a difficult situation 
on its own, but Jordan exists — sometimes 
tenuously — in a very difficult neighbor-
hood, surrounded by more powerful states 
whose problems seem continually to spill 
over into the Hashemite kingdom.
 Between 2011 and 2013, more than 
half a million Syrian refugees crossed into 
Jordan to escape the horrors of the Syrian 
war, joining previous waves of refugees 
that had fled to Jordan since its indepen-
dence in 1946: Palestinians (in several 
waves) from the west, Iraqis from the 
east and now Syrians from the north. The 
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ful domestic and foreign policy. This did 
not mean, however, that top policy mak-
ers, including the king himself, took the 
Arab uprisings lightly. To the contrary, the 
regime responded by launching a series of 
domestic political reforms: amending the 
constitution, establishing a constitutional 
court, revising electoral and party laws, and 
holding new rounds of national parliamen-
tary and municipal elections.6 King Abdul-
lah emphasized the depth of reform in the 
kingdom, arguing that Jordan was unique: 
an Arab regime that was, in effect, reform-
ing itself while the fires of unrest burned 
elsewhere.7 For many reform activists, 
however, the reforms remained limited at 
best; far deeper change was needed to truly 
transform and democratize Jordan.8  
 Even as internal debates over the depth 
and breadth of reform continued to rage, 
the regime actively marketed its reform ef-
forts to powerful Western allies, emphasiz-
ing what it saw as Jordan’s exceptionalism. 
Defusing potentially revolutionary pres-
sures from within was part of the regime’s 
strategy, but equally important was using 
foreign policy to ensure that the kingdom 
would have powerful backers to help it 
survive. These strategies are linked; key 
Western allies have placed only minimal 
pressure on the kingdom to pursue greater 
domestic political reform. Internal reform 
efforts are designed in part to secure con-
tinued and even deepening support for the 
Hashemite regime, both inside and outside 
the kingdom, including  from the United 
States and the European Union. Thus even 
as the regime tried, through domestic 
political reform, to create a “third way” 
between authoritarian rule and revolution, 
it also relied heavily on foreign policy and 
external allies to ensure its own security 
and that of the nation.
timing of this new wave was even more 
problematic than usual. Even for a poor 
country, Jordan was experiencing harsh 
economic constraints, vast budget deficits, 
and economic austerity measures in com-
pliance with the International Monetary 
Fund (IMF). The latter policies had trig-
gered protests and riots, most extensively 
in November 2012.4 Now, just when the 
kingdom was struggling to bring its own 
economic house in order, it found itself 
dealing with the additional economic, so-
cial and political costs of hosting hundreds 
of thousands of desperate Syrian refugees. 
 During the first three years of the Arab 
Spring, when Jordan’s economy remained 
dismal and the political reform process in-
complete and highly contested, the Syrian 
civil war threatened to drag the kingdom 
into a conflict it was desperately trying 
to avoid.5 Jordan may not have endured a 
revolution during the Arab Spring of 2011-
13, but it did see political instability in 
the form of five different prime ministers 
and six different governments in that time 
span. The Hashemite regime has historical-
ly maintained stability by using a strategy 
of coopting elites by bringing them into the 
ruling system. Prime ministers and govern-
ments (all royal appointees) are reshuffled 
periodically, effectively rearranging ruling 
coalitions, so that many share a sense of 
having a deep stake in the status quo. 
 The kingdom has also relied on ex-
ternal sources of economic aid, as well as 
trade and investment relationships with 
more well-to-do states. As such, Jordanian 
foreign relations are as vital to the king-
dom’s domestic stability as they are to its 
regional and external security. When the 
Arab revolutions and uprisings began, the 
regime viewed them as a contagion that 
could nonetheless be limited through care-
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ternal opposition, as in Bahrain, in Yemen 
and, most dramatically, in Syria. 
 For Jordan, the Arab uprisings, revo-
lutions and civil wars triggered multiple 
policy shifts as the kingdom responded to 
ever-changing situations in Egypt and Syr-
ia, while renewing its attempt to join the 
stronghold of Arab monarchies: the Gulf 
Cooperation Council (GCC). As always, 
Jordanian foreign policy also emphasized 
shoring up alliances with global powers.
The United States and the EU
 In March 2013, U.S. President Barack 
Obama visited the Middle East to meet 
with the leaders of Israel, the Palestinian 
National Authority and Jordan. The presi-
dential visit to Jordan helped underscore 
the U.S. role in supporting Jordan — and 
the Hashemite monarchy — politically, ec-
onomically and militarily. Jordan has been 
a strong ally of the United States since the 
earliest days of the Cold War. During the 
long reign of King Hussein, Jordan posi-
tioned itself as a conservative anti-commu-
nist bulwark in the region,  making itself a 
key recipient of U.S. foreign aid. This aid 
has been vital to the kingdom, as it is not 
blessed with oil or other lucrative natural 
resources. With neighbors including Israel, 
Syria, Iraq and Saudi Arabia, the kingdom 
is at all times deeply vulnerable, but it 
is also geopolitically vital to any hopes 
for peace and stability in the region. This 
chronic insecurity, combined with the lack 
of natural resources, has led the regime 
to place a premium on retaining power-
ful allies. Maintaining and deepening its 
relationship with the United States remains 
a top foreign policy goal. Today, Jordan re-
mains dependent on foreign aid, both eco-
nomic and military.10 For King Abdullah 
II, who has pursued a series of neoliberal 
economic policies that have endeared the 
FOREIGN RELATIONS 
 Jordan’s alliance patterns offer a sharp 
contrast. Within the region, its foreign 
relations (especially in inter-Arab poli-
tics) have been characterized by shifting 
alignments. Globally, however, it has 
maintained close ties with the world’s 
most powerful Western states, including 
the United States, the United Kingdom 
(the former mandatory power that drew 
Jordan’s borders and even chose the 
Hashemites as rulers) and, collectively, 
the European Union (EU). In terms of 
non-Arab regional powers, Jordan has 
maintained a peace treaty with the state 
of Israel since 1994 and proper, if cold 
and mutually suspicious, relations with 
the Islamic Republic of Iran since the 
1979 revolution. The kingdom had closer 
relations with Iran during the reign of the 
last shah, when both states positioned 
themselves as conservative, anti-com-
munist and pro-Western monarchies. 
With Turkey, Jordan has historically had 
good relations, although these have been 
strained during the tenure of Prime Minis-
ter Recep Tayyip Erdogan and his Islamist 
Justice and Development Party (AKP). 
The Jordanian regime seemed to regard 
them effectively as a Turkish version of 
the Muslim Brotherhood. 
 Prior to the outbreak of the Arab upris-
ings, Jordan had developed such strong 
relations with Egypt and Saudi Arabia that 
former Foreign Minister Marwan Muasher 
had coined the phrase “the Arab center” 
to describe their moderate foreign poli-
cies (even as their regimes and domestic 
politics remained starkly different).9 Dur-
ing the Arab Spring, however, inter-Arab 
alliances and alignments across the region 
shifted several times, as regimes fell in 
Egypt, Libya and Tunisia, while others 
remained roiled by varying degrees of in-
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parliamentary government and a constitu-
tional monarchy.13 
 As for the economic aspects of 
Jordanian-EU relations, Jordan signed an 
Association Agreement with the EU in 
1997. This became official in 2002, initiat-
ing a kind of 12-year probationary period. 
That period has now come to a successful 
end, marking the start of Jordanian-EU 
negotiations to move toward the next step: 
an EU-Jordan free-trade agreement (FTA). 
The Jordanian government views a po-
tential FTA with the EU as another clear 
marker of its own status, deeply imbedded 
in a web of Western or Western-led eco-
nomic institutions, from the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) to the World Bank 
and World Trade Organization (WTO). 
This international position is perhaps made 
even clearer by the choice of Jordan to 
host multiple annual meetings of the World 
Economic Forum (WEF) at the Dead Sea. 
But the linchpin to all these key economic 
relationships remains close alignment with 
the United States and the EU. 
The Gulf Cooperation Council
 In terms of local alliances, Jordan 
(along with Morocco) had received an invi-
tation to join the Gulf Cooperation Council 
(GCC), an alliance of Arab oil monarchies: 
Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi 
Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. The 
initiative appeared to have come from a 
worried Saudi regime, in particular, at the 
height of the uprisings that toppled Saudi 
allies in Tunisia and Egypt. After the fall of 
Hosni Mubarak, the Saudis were angered 
that the United States hadn’t backed up the 
Egyptian regime. Saudi policy appeared 
to be marked by reactionary and sectar-
ian concerns about the impact of the Arab 
Spring on both monarchies in general and 
Sunni-led regimes in the region. 
regime still further to Washington, the U.S. 
relationship provides the economic under-
pinnings of both the state and the regime. 
These include not only extensive foreign 
aid, but also U.S. investment in the devel-
opment of the kingdom, as well as trade re-
lations (which have increased, particularly 
since the establishment of the U.S.-Jordan 
Free Trade Agreement in 2002).11 
 Perhaps ironically, given the depth of 
the U.S.-Jordanian alliance, it has at times 
been a mixed blessing for the Hashemite 
regime. The Jordanian monarchy has ben-
efitted immensely from extensive U.S. aid, 
to be sure. But Jordan’s close relations with 
the U.S. government also link the Hashem-
ite kingdom to the many very unpopular 
American policies toward the Middle East 
and are something of a liability, in terms of 
domestic and regional legitimacy. But for 
the regime itself, the benefits far outweigh 
any costs and are, in fact, essential to the 
economic development as well as the na-
tional security of the state.
 Jordan has long had close ties to the 
former colonial power Britain, but has also 
steadily increased its ties to the European 
Union. Today, the EU is Jordan’s larg-
est trading partner. The kingdom is also a 
member of the EU Union for the Mediter-
ranean and a participant in the European 
Neighborhood Policy. As part of the 
Action Plan for the Neighborhood Policy, 
the EU has pressed (and also provided 
financial support) for Jordan to move 
further on three areas of special concern 
to the EU: rule of law, good governance 
and human rights.12 It is not accidental 
that Jordan’s recent reform efforts have 
emphasized changes to the constitution 
and the creation of a constitutional court, 
an independent electoral commission, 
new laws for parties and elections, and at 
least initial discussions regarding eventual 
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 Just as important, the Jordanians felt 
that they had something significant to offer 
in return. As one of only two Arab states 
holding a peace treaty with Israel and as a 
close ally of the United States and Britain, 
Jordan was in a position to talk to just 
about anybody. It could credibly act as a 
mediator in regional disputes. And while it 
might be poor in capital and resources, it 
was rich in a highly educated workforce. 
The kingdom also had one of the region’s 
most sophisticated intelligence services, 
the General Intelligence Directorate (GID). 
And while its armed forces were small, 
they were among the best-trained in the 
Arab world, so adept in fact, that they had 
developed the regional specialty of training 
other countries’ police and special forces. 
 The Jordanians flatly rejected the idea 
that a seat at the GCC table would amount 
to charity. While the Jordanians did indeed 
desire the many economic benefits of 
joining such a rich bloc, they felt that in 
return they could offer a talented work 
force, as well as extensive security sup-
port to the GCC. Some Jordanian officials 
even complained that Jordan was already 
helping the GCC states in these security 
areas, with little reward, and that full 
GCC membership would simply codify an 
already existing relationship.15 Yet after 
the initial urgency seemed to wear off, the 
GCC offer noticeably cooled, becoming 
mired in committees and subcommittees 
and various forms of bureaucracy designed 
to slow the accession process.
 The initial GCC offer seemed to have 
been pushed by a nervous Saudi Arabia in 
the early days of the Arab uprisings; other 
states had been cool to the idea all along, 
including Qatar. Jordanian-Qatari relations 
had been problematic for years, oscillating 
between periods of rapprochement and re-
crimination. Since Qatar maintained strong 
 While neither Morocco nor Jordan 
were Gulf states, both were hereditary 
Sunni monarchies, like most of the GCC 
states. The Hashemite king shared the fears 
of GCC monarchs that a more power-
ful Iran would meddle in the domestic 
affairs and internal stability of the Arab 
monarchies. Jordan had so often turned 
to the wealthy GCC states to bail it out of 
difficult economic situations, that it had a 
vested interest in the stability and survival 
of its sometime-allies in the GCC. Jordan’s 
concerns with Iranian power and influ-
ence date back to the Iranian revolution 
itself and King Hussein’s decision to back 
Saddam Hussein’s Iraq in its eight-year 
war with Khomeini’s Iran. In the years of 
the Abdullah II regime, Jordanian officials 
have feared that Iranian power has seemed 
to be marching steadily closer to Jordan. 
In 2003, after the U.S. invasion of Iraq, the 
new Shia-led government in Baghdad en-
joyed close relations with Iran, already the 
main backer of Hezbollah in Lebanon and 
the Assad regime in Syria. For the Jorda-
nians, this suggested a rising Iranian threat 
not only across the Gulf, but also across 
Jordan’s eastern and northern borders. 
 Given its dire economic straits and stra-
tegic and security concerns regarding Syria, 
Iraq and Iran, Jordan gratefully grasped the 
possibility of joining the GCC. Despite the 
general regional ridicule that accompanied 
this proposal for expanding it to become an 
even larger club of Sunni Arab monarchies, 
the Jordanians took the offer seriously. Jor-
dan’s foreign ministry worked extensively 
on the issue, even as the GCC later seemed 
to cool on the idea. For Jordan, the GCC 
offered the potential of oil at more conces-
sionary prices, aid, investment and trade.14 
GCC membership might revive the mori-
bund Jordanian economy and help secure 
both state and regime. 
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ties to Jordan’s large Muslim Brotherhood 
organization, and hence ties to the single 
largest opposition group in the kingdom, 
Jordanian-Qatari relations were at all times 
tenuous, with Jordan by far the more vul-
nerable party. 
Syria
 Even as the Jordanians continued 
their push to maintain rapprochement with 
Qatar, and hence to keep their GCC mem-
bership bid alive, Syria descended into 
years of brutal civil war.16 The Jordanians 
urged a negotiated settlement, suggesting 
that Assad should leave power, but that a 
gradual negotiated transition would be best 
for Syrians and their neighbors. A lengthy 
civil war, they warned, risked turning Syria 
into another Afghanistan, Iraq or even 
Somalia, where years of unrest, instability 
and terrorism followed war. The Jordani-
ans were particularly worried, as Damas-
cus was so close to Amman, and thousands 
of Syrian refugees were pouring across the 
border to flee the violence in their country. 
By the end of 2013, Jordan — a country 
of 7 million — was already hosting more 
than 600,000 Syrian refugees. The Zaatari 
refugee camp had become the fourth-larg-
est “city” in Jordan. 
 The Jordanian dilemma about Syria 
was certainly rooted deeply in the refugee 
crisis.17 But the regime was also worried 
about potential Islamist ascendancy in 
Damascus after the war, even suggesting 
that a Muslim Brotherhood axis, of new 
Islamist-led regimes, might be emerging 
in the region. The same regime that had 
earlier feared a Shia axis including Leba-
non, Syria, Iraq and Iran was now visual-
izing a potential Sunni axis, but not one 
marked by Jordanian-style moderation.18 
The Jordanians also feared rising Islamist 
militancy in Syria, and the return of Jorda-
nian salafi jihadists once the war was over. 
The Jordanian regime was concerned that 
unrest would, in effect, be imported into 
the kingdom through either Islamist mili-
tancy or Baathist sleeper agents, activated 
by a Damascus regime angered by Jordan’s 
alleged support for the rebels.19 
 The Jordanian government insisted 
that it was neutral in the Syrian civil war, 
though media reports suggested that GCC 
countries — especially Saudi Arabia and 
Qatar — were purchasing arms for the Syr-
ian rebels and funneling them into Syria 
from both Turkey and Jordan.20 Media 
reports in the West continually discussed 
CIA training in Jordan of Syrian rebel 
fighters, despite Jordanian government de-
nials. Syria’s President Assad complained 
that Jordan was meddling in Syrian affairs, 
warning that this was playing with fire. His 
comment followed joint military exercises 
conducted in Jordan, near the border with 
Syria, that involved the armed forces of 
18 other countries, including the United 
States. Jordanian officials noted, correctly, 
that these were the third-annual “Eager 
Lion” exercises, planned before Syria’s 
war began. Nonetheless, they drew notice 
and anger in Damascus. 
 Even when the exercises ended, the Jor-
danian government asked the United States 
to leave behind Patriot Missile Defense 
batteries and F-16 jet fighters to bolster the 
Jordanian-Syrian border. Washington did 
so and left several hundred troops as well, 
nominally to maintain the missile batteries 
and planes. These were sensitive matters 
within Jordanian domestic politics, how-
ever, and both pro-regime and opposition 
figures condemned any continued U.S. or 
other foreign deployment on Jordanian soil. 
The regime found itself continually denying 
that Jordan would serve as a “launchpad” 
for any U.S. or Western attack on Syria. Yet, 
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sounding increasingly alike. On Syria, 
however, the lengthy civil war had become 
something of a wedge issue, sharply divid-
ing even the traditional sources of opposi-
tion. Many secular leftists backed Assad, 
arguing that the crisis was a Western-led 
conspiracy against the leading state in the 
“resistance” to Israeli and Western impe-
rial ambitions. Yet Jordan’s large Islamist 
movements, ranging from the long-estab-
lished Muslim Brotherhood to a smaller 
but resurgent salafi movement, called for 
the ouster of the Assad regime. Other Jor-
danian Islamists called for direct support 
for the rebel movement in Syria. In private 
capacities, some salafi fighters crossed 
over from Jordan to fight Assad. 
 The Hashemite regime itself, mean-
while, saw all potential outcomes in 
Syria as problematic in varying degrees. A 
hostile Assad would be a danger to Jordan, 
but so would an unstable post-Assad Syria, 
especially if it became another Islamist re-
gime or perhaps a failed state wracked by 
sectarian violence. As it tried to deal with 
the internal and external pressures gener-
ated in part by the Syrian civil war and 
the Arab uprisings, the Jordanian regime 
attempted, as usual, simply to weather the 
storm. But it faced intense pressure from 
Assad to stay out and from its own allies 
(especially Saudi Arabia, Qatar and the 
United States) to do more.
 It would be difficult to exaggerate the 
security challenges to Jordan today, yet 
many liberal and progressive reformists 
fear that the regime’s security concerns will 
derail Jordan’s own already limited and 
incomplete political reform process.23 But 
even as the regime and its opponents wor-
ried about the different impacts of regional 
crises on their internal politics, the very 
tangible challenge of the refugee crisis con-
tinued to increase. The strains on Jordan’s 
as fighting raged in and near Daraa, just 
across the border, Syrian missiles and artil-
lery shells landed in Jordan several times. 
 Jordan’s defensive moves to shore up 
its border also increased its internal and 
external security dilemmas in two ways. 
First, how to increase defenses without un-
intentionally provoking Syria; and second, 
how to ensure external security without 
raising the ire of internal opposition.21 
Conservative nationalists were sensitive to 
any slights to Jordanian sovereignty and 
continually rejected any internationally 
brokered deal that would make Jordan the 
“alternative homeland” (al-watan al-
badeel) for the Palestinian people, or for 
Syrian or Iraqi refugees, for that matter. 
Islamists, leftists and pan-Arab nationalists 
just as routinely criticized Jordanian policy 
for being too close to Western powers, re-
actionary Arab states and especially Israel; 
and they too warned of alleged conspira-
cies about an alternative homeland.  
 When King Abdullah returned from 
Washington in April 2013, having worked 
to shore up U.S. support, he was met by 
a third major “manifesto” from a set of 
one thousand opposition figures.22 Previ-
ous manifestos, from tribal leaders and 
retired army officers (both traditionally 
pro-Hashemite constituencies), had harshly 
criticized the regime’s domestic economic 
and political agenda. The new one, whose 
signatories included leftists, nationalists, 
Hirak representatives and trade unionists, 
as well as tribal leaders and retired army 
officers, decried plots to undermine Jorda-
nian sovereignty, condemned the neoliber-
al economic policies of the state and once 
again rejected any plans for Israel to solve 
the Palestinian issue at Jordanian expense 
(“the Jordanian option”).
 On many of these issues, left- and 
right-wing opposition within Jordan were 
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economy, social services, water resources 
and political stability were severe, especial-
ly in the context of an economic recession 
in a deeply indebted country. 
Egypt
 In July 2013, domestic attention in Jor-
dan shifted dramatically from the Syrian 
war to yet another regime change in Egypt, 
when a military coup d’état forced out the 
Muslim Brotherhood and Egypt’s Islamist 
President Mohamed Morsi. The military 
move, led by Defense Minister el-Sissi, 
had followed a massive public-protest 
campaign against the Brotherhood govern-
ment in Cairo. The “Tamarod” campaign 
had mobilized millions, including even 
more demonstrators in Tahrir Square than 
the protests that generated the January 
25, 2011, revolution in the first place. Yet 
many secular activists would quickly find 
that secular military authoritarians were 
just as dangerous to their democratic goals 
as the Muslim Brotherhood seemed to 
have been. 
 For Jordanian foreign policy, how-
ever, there was no wavering whatsoever in 
reacting to regime change in Egypt. King 
Abdullah made a personal visit to Cairo 
immediately after the ouster of President 
Morsi, endorsing the new secular regime 
and the ouster of the Brotherhood and 
cementing a renewed close relationship 
between Jordan and Egypt. In October 
2013, Egypt’s “interim president,” Adly 
Mansour, paid a state visit to four key Arab 
allies — Jordan, Kuwait, Saud Arabia 
and the UAE — to shore up support for 
the new Egyptian regime. In Jordan, this 
simply reinforced the warming of relations 
after the ouster of President Morsi and the 
Muslim Brotherhood. 
 The kingdom’s own Islamist move-
ment reacted with alarm and even horror to 
these developments. If anything, Jordan’s 
Muslim Brotherhood had been biding 
its time, expecting an eventual Islamist 
victory in Syria to consolidate with the 
Islamist success in Egypt. Many Jordanian 
Islamists felt that their patience since Jor-
danian independence in 1946 would soon 
pay off. They had strenuously avoided 
participating in the regime-led reform 
process, boycotting both national and local 
elections and rejecting the entire project 
as a sham. The eventual collapse of Assad 
and the rise of successful Islamist regimes 
in both Cairo and Damascus, however, 
might have empowered the Brotherhood 
against the Hashemite monarchy, forcing 
more dramatic change. But now, with the 
ouster of the Brotherhood in Egypt and the 
Hashemite regime’s active endorsement 
of the move, Jordan’s Islamist movement 
was once again in disarray. This deepened 
the split between the dovish and hawk-
ish wings of the movement and, to some 
extent, splits along lines of identity.
 If the Jordanian regime felt insecure 
during the early months of the Arab upris-
ings in 2011— and perhaps especially so 
during the November 2012 riots triggered 
by economic austerity measures — it was 
noticeably more confident in 2013 and 
2014. Jordan had managed to survive, as 
usual, without a revolution of its own. But 
domestic and regional tensions persisted. 
Despite Jordan’s attempts to avoid the 
Syrian conflict, the kingdom remained 
under considerable pressure from both its 
Gulf and Western allies to play a larger 
role. Jordanian foreign policy is predicated 
on maintaining multiple economic, politi-
cal and military allies at the regional and 
global levels; yet these were allies who 
were difficult to ignore and were vital as 
guarantors of Jordanian economic viability, 
political stability and security. 
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bers of the Security Council. In December 
2013, Jordan was elected to the UNSC for 
2014-16, marking yet another key foreign-
policy move to ensure the survival of the 
kingdom even amidst a particularly tumul-
tuous time in regional politics.24 
 The Arab Spring had shaken Jordan 
at a time when the kingdom already had 
its hands full with its own struggles over 
domestic political reform and an economic 
crisis. The arrival of the regional upheavals 
exacerbated both dilemmas, while adding 
intensely to external-security constraints. 
While supporters of the Hashemite regime 
heralded the regime-led reform process 
and its various achievements, its opponents 
decried the reforms as minor and cosmetic 
at best. Many activists charged, further, 
that the kingdom’s own allies were a major 
source of concern, arguing that the United 
States and the EU were satisfied with small 
procedural reforms rather than democrati-
zation, while local allies — such as Egypt, 
Saudi Arabia, and the other GCC mon-
archies — might exercise a reactionary 
influence on Jordan’s reform program.25 
Regardless of which of these interpreta-
tions one accepts, it seems clear that much 
more needs to be done. 
 The regime and, indeed, the country 
itself are by no means able to rest on the 
domestic status quo. To ensure greater 
security for both regime and society, 
deeper political and economic reform is 
needed; even deft use of foreign policy 
as a tool to ensure domestic security will 
not be enough in the long term. Yet, as the 
Arab uprisings continue to rock the Middle 
East, the Hashemite regime will attempt 
to use its foreign-policy ties to regional 
and global powers to solidify both the 
monarchy and the state in order to survive 
yet another series of internal and external 
threats to Jordan’s security and survival. 
CONCLUSIONS
 The Jordanian regime continues to 
view itself as a bastion of moderation, 
stability, political reform (including limited 
liberalization) and especially of neoliberal 
economic policies such as privatization, 
free trade and openness to foreign invest-
ment. Despite its misgivings regarding 
U.S. priorities (such as launching the Iraq 
War and neglecting the Israeli-Palestinian 
peace process), the Hashemite regime 
regards its alliance with the United States 
and its burgeoning relations with the 
European Union as key strategic interests 
and sees itself as in sync with both on most 
foreign policy issues. Jordan even views 
itself as a model for the region regarding 
policy areas of deepest concern to West-
ern governments and Western-led global 
institutions: supporting neoliberal eco-
nomic politics, pursuing domestic political 
reform, combating militant Islamism and 
terrorism, stabilizing Iraq, bringing an end 
to the Syrian civil war, and restoring the 
Arab-Israeli peace process. 
 Jordan played on its own reputation for 
moderation when, in late 2013, it became a 
surprise candidate for membership on the 
UN Security Council (UNSC). The General 
Assembly had actually elected Saudi Arabia 
to the seat, but even as congratulations were 
being sent to Riyadh, the Saudis refused 
to accept their own election, decrying the 
ineffectiveness of the UNSC, especially in 
regard to the Syrian civil war and the plight 
of the Palestinian people. The Jordanians 
quickly seized the opportunity, as a very ac-
tive member of the United Nations (includ-
ing in global peacekeeping operations) and 
ran for the seat themselves. This took deft 
diplomacy; Jordanian officials carefully 
made sure that the kingdom would have 
the support of Saudi Arabia and other Arab 
states, as well as all five permanent mem-
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